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INTRODUCTION 1  
The changes in United Nations (UN) "peacekeeping" operations within the last five years 
have been both dramatic and multifaceted. This article attempts to show that the media 
(particularly those of the United States, which are dominant within, and may under most 
circumstances be taken as virtually identical to, the international media) have in all their 
aspects become, and remain, critical elements in determining the success or failure of 
these operations. It points to three principal areas of current practice regarding the media 
which have contributed to the failure or partial failure of recent UN "peacekeeping" 
missions. One of these is a failure of understanding of the media exhibited by the 
government and military forces of the United States, as the result of doctrine established 
before the end of the Cold War. Another is the failure of the UN or its constituent 
members to respond effectively to anti-peacekeeper propaganda, especially that 
promulgated by political authorities in target countries for "peacekeeping," and including 
their ability to exploit the international media for propaganda purposes. The third is the 
failure of the UN to develop "peacekeeping" doctrine which takes the value of the media 
into account. The article calls for advances in international relations theory in this field as 
an aid to further understanding.  
CHANGES IN PEACEKEEPING: PRACTICE WITHOUT THEORY 
The very term "peacekeeping" is of course a problem in terminology. Prompted by the 
statement of Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace that "the time of absolute 
and exclusive sovereignty has passed" to be replaced by "universal sovereignty,"2 UN 
"peacekeeping" efforts have seen a multiplication of terminology in search of a meaning, 
to explain the roles required by the UN of forces involved in sponsored or sanctioned 
intervention operations usually involving intra-state conflicts. Of the presently available 
choices, "Wider Peacekeeping" appears the most popular and "Humanitarian 
Intervention" the most sensible. While the term "peacekeeping" is clearly now 
unsatisfactory, it will be used in this article (without parentheses hereafter) to avoid the 
search for an alternative becoming an end in itself.3  
Since 1990, the UN has mounted more peacekeeping operations than in the whole of its 
previous history: a total of 17 operations to the end of 1994 involving 70,000 personnel 
and requiring the doubling of the UN peacekeeping budget to US$3.3 billion from 1992 
to 1994, with US$1.7 billion going to former Yugoslavia alone.4Whereas from the first 
UN peacekeeping operations (properly so called) in Suez in 1956, troops employed have 
been traditionally from lesser states, since 1990 every permanent member of the UN 
Security Council except China has contributed troops to an overseas peacekeeping or 
humanitarian mission either sanctioned or sponsored by the UN. In addition, the member 
countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have taken on a new 
peacekeeping role under the terms of the Helsinki Final Document The Challenges of 
Change of July 1992. The basis of much of this new form of peacekeeping has been the 
challenge to Article 2.7 of the UN Charter on internal state sovereignty made by Security 
Council resolutions, which have linked humanitarian intervention with Chapter VII of the 
Charter, starting with Resolution 680 of March 1991 on Iraq, and followed by Resolution 
794 of December 1992 on Somalia and Resolution 940 of September 1994 on Haiti.5  
Most of the expansion in UN peacekeeping since 1990 has been driven  directly or 
indirectly  by the policies of the United States. Equally, in what is still a very confused 
field of research, there has been at least a consensus among practitioners of peacekeeping 
that international media coverage has played a significant part in the decisions of the 
United States whether or not to intervene in the intra-state disputes or wars of other 
countries, and the manner and duration of those interventions. This in turn has had a 
significant impact upon the policies of the few other countries with the military capacity 
to mount such intervention operations (at least in association with each other and at UN 
bequest) and the political will to do so. As identified by Boutros-Ghali, this effectively 
means the French and British, together with the Canadians (who have a long history of 
specialization in peacekeeping in its earlier sense).6Other middle ranking NATO or 
European Union powers may be added to this list in the future.  
Following the failures and (at best) mixed successes of major UN peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations in northern Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti, 
the idea is already spreading that the initial UN enthusiasm for intervention was little 
more than hubris in seeking to claim a new role for itself after the collapse of Soviet 
communism, and that the television images that are held to have prompted or stimulated 
intervention are already losing their power.7 In this optimistic model of the future the 
events of 1990-95 may be perceived as exceptional, an aftershock to the collapse of the 
Soviet world. A middle position, particularly after President Bill Clinton's statement to 
the UN of 27 September 1993 on American willingness to engage in future peacekeeping 
operations, (together with Presidential Decision Directive [PDD] 25 of 1995), is that the 
United States might supply logistics, transport and intelligence services, and possibly 
combat aircraft, for future operations, leaving the lesser NATO powers (or others) to 
supply the troops on the ground. The beginnings of this model have already been visible 
in the peacekeeping structures in Somalia 1992-94 and particularly former Yugoslavia 
1992-95.8 A conservative or pessimistic position is that of a return almost to a Cold War 
status quo reminiscent of the 1970s, in which intra-state wars in the Third World will 
continue largely unchecked, and international media intrusion into foreign affairs will be 
disregarded once more by Western policy makers, as the American public in particular 
becomes educated in the realities of power, or develops a form of "compassion fatigue."  
The American reluctance to commit troops to peacekeeping (and occasionally that of 
other NATO members) is often expressed in terms of a reluctance to suffer casualties, 
with the potential or actual loss of even one American becoming a major concern both in 
Somalia in October 1993 and Bosnia in September 1995. Although humanitarian instincts 
may play a part in this phenomenon, it is perhaps more accurate to say that American 
governments in particular are highly sensitive to casualties in military operations in 
which a vital national interest, a "reason to die for," may not be apparent. This sensitivity, 
in turn, depends upon international media reporting of these casualties and its impact 
upon domestic support for the operation in question. The apparent extent of this 
sensitivity is now such as to call into question the entire utility of the United States' 
massive armed forces (and those of some other NATO nations) other than for home 
defence or entirely symbolic purposes.9 One very apparent effect of American sensitivity 
toward the media's treatment of the casualty issue has been to expose and amplify 
divisions between the United States and other NATO members. Even in Britain, 
previously strong supporters of a close military connection with the United States have 
begun to reconsider their positions.10  
That these various problems and failures are attributable to the effects of the media 
(domestic and international) upon governments may seem a rather large claim; and 
clearly there are other factors involved in policy-making. However, a wide acceptance 
exists among the policy makers themselves that changes in the nature of the media, and in 
particular the globalization of television news making possible instantaneous "real time" 
(or nearly "real time") reporting, does play a significant part in the decision-making 
process. At the time of the Gulf War the (then) Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, 
Benjamin Netanyahu, suggested that this was a new phenomenon in international politics: 
"we now have a Heisenberg physics of politics. As you observe a phenomenon with 
television, instantly you modify it somewhat."11 But 1991 was only the mid-period of 
rapidly developing global television transmissions and the miniaturization of equipment, 
to the extent that already in 1995 the media technology used to cover the Gulf War was 
considered to be out of date. Ease of reach and transmission is now such that any physical 
(as opposed to institutional) means of controlling television output from a war zone or 
crisis area is on the verge of becoming effectively impossible, other than by jamming 
(increasingly unlikely as commercial telephones will in the near future be used to 
transmit pictures) or physical intimidation and restraint of the crews and destruction of 
the apparatus.  
The failure of academic theory and research in the field of international relations to keep 
pace with these rapid changes is understandable, if only because of the so many different 
facets of theory to which the study of the media must be related. Since the 1980s, the 
news media, both as a business and as a cultural phenomenon, have been at the forefront 
of the issue of globalization. At the same time, while international in reach and 
penetration, the news media of the United States in particular remains parochial in 
content; while studies of the news media of Europe lay stress on their continuing cultural 
fragmentation. The relationships between governments and media, and which parts of the 
media are judged significant in influencing policy, are also markedly different throughout 
the countries of NATO and of the European Union.12 Equally, seeking to combine "media 
studies" with "defence studies" does not at present sit comfortably with either 
discipline.13 Nuclear deterrence theory, the mainstay of academic defence studies until 
the end of the Cold War era, was the very epitome of an elite perspective upon decision-
making, with the mass of the population seen usually in a passive role, and the role of the 
mass media as very indirect; and in which "warfighting" or military operations figured as 
a secondary consideration, if at all.  
Nonetheless, the necessity for academic theory to integrate the role of the media with 
other aspects of international relations is now both evident and urgent. The armed forces 
of a state represent the most obvious (and perhaps the last) manifestation of its 
independent power and authority. Their interaction with a globalized media, and the 
impact of that interaction upon policy and action, is now an aspect of first importance in 
modern international studies.14 The failure or partial failure of recent peacekeeping 
operations undertaken with no theory or doctrine of media relations, or with a theory that 
is seriously flawed, may be taken as evidence of this assertion.  
AMERICAN MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONS: THE FAILURE OF A THEORY 
Present United States' policies and attitudes toward the media during peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations sponsored or sanctioned by the UN have their roots in two 
highly controversial hypotheses, first promulgated in the 1970s. The first of these is the 
belief that in some (usually ill-defined) way the Vietnam War was "lost on the television 
screens of America;" amplified in some cases by the view that the role of the American 
media over first the bombing of Cambodia and then the Watergate scandal, in eventually 
bringing down President Richard Nixon, showed them to be in some way unpatriotic or 
untrustworthy.15 This distrust of the American media within the military and (at least) the 
right wing of the Republican Party has had implications that have been perhaps 
underestimated within the field of defence studies. While it is now a commonplace that, 
in any realistic sense, the American media played little or no part in losing the Vietnam 
War,16 the opposite belief was widely held at the time by politicians and newsmen as well 
as the American military,17 and has had a dominant effect upon American doctrine and 
posture for conventional wars ever since.  
Adjustments to the American doctrine of "Limited War" in the conventional sense that 
have taken place since Vietnam, including the famous Weinberger Rules of 1984, and 
most completely expressed by General Colin L. Powell, have all favored the early and 
overwhelming use of American military force. This new doctrine of fighting short but 
highly aggressive wars was introduced very largely out of the realistic fear that American 
public opinion, as expressed through and by the media, would not support a protracted 
war or a more gradual use of military force (usually characterized as a "quagmire"). It 
was given military reality by the US Army Field Manual FM 100-5 Operations of 
1982/86 under the name of 'AirLand Battle' (also adopted by the US Air Force in 1984), 
which, although intended as a global doctrine for all warfighting including the putative 
defence of Western Europe against the Warsaw Pact, contained many of the necessary 
military concepts to make a "short sharp war" elsewhere in the world practical. Although 
countries have made errors in their military doctrines through wish-fulfilment in the past 
(most obviously the French doctrine of the offensive before 1914) the scale of impact of 
what is essentially an error in media analysis upon America's military posture (and its 
transmission to other countries through shared military doctrines) may be without 
precedent.18 One of its more important side effects is that the troops of the United States, 
trained to take immediate and violent action, are presently widely regarded as unsuitable 
for peacekeeping operations, to their own evident irritation. As one British-based 
commentator has put it, "Most people tend to view the concept of Americans doing 
peacekeeping the way they might view using a Rottweiller as a seeing-eye dog."19  
The second hypothesis to influence American official attitudes toward the media and 
peacekeeping also owes much to right-wing and military interpretations of the defeat in 
Vietnam. In one sense it contradicts the first hypothesis that television (and to a lesser 
extent newspaper) coverage of the war zone had a major impact upon attitudes to the war 
at home; however, it also arose in part from this earlier view, after statistical evidence 
failed to support the idea of a direct link between the media and mass public opinion on 
the war. This hypothesis postulates the existence within the United States of multiple and 
changing constituencies of elites (including of course members of government, of 
business, of the military and of the media) whose views largely dictate mass public 
opinion. Particularly in foreign affairs (for which there is abundant evidence of the 
indifference of the mass of the American public) a broad consensus of elites in support of 
government policy will be reflected in the media and will carry mass opinion with it; 
whereas divisions among the elites will produce similar divisions in the media and among 
the people. The implications of this hypothesis are that whatever influence the American 
media may have on foreign affairs, including military deployments overseas, rests not 
with instantaneous news broadcasts from the front line, but with appearances on ABC 
Television's Nightline current affairs program and with the power of editorials in the four 
main daily newspapers (The New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and 
Wall Street Journal); coupled with the "op-ed" page, in theory open to all-comers but in 
practice often used by senior government officials to exert wider influence among the 
elites.20 The acceptance of this role by newspapers is reflected in a New York Times 
editorial shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait arguing that "sophisticated citizens" 
understood the need for an American military deployment to Saudi Arabia, and that it 
was "up to the occupant of the bully pulpit to educate ordinary citizens," including 
relatives of the troops sent to the Gulf, "to these harsh realities."21  
An acceptance of this hypothesis would appear also to involve a further acceptance that 
the impact of real-time television upon diplomacy and military operations  the often-
feared "CNN Effect"  has little substance or significance other than as part of a panem et 
circenses act for a politically irrelevant voting public.22 Passing over the very serious 
implications of this for domestic politics, this hypothesis has the advantage, for those 
who believe that the commitment of military forces overseas both functions best and is 
best understood when decided by elites alone, of permitting a return once more to the 
theories and behavior of the Cold War. However, as with every other current hypothesis 
on the impact of the media, the elites hypothesis appears to represent at best a poor fit for 
reality, and has been effectively challenged in the aftermath of the Gulf War.23 
Regardless of this debate, the political implication for governments including this view of 
the media in their decision processes is worthy of much further study.  
As a legacy of these two hypotheses, the attitude of the American military and defence 
community toward its own media in covering military operations continues (despite cases 
of genuine good will on all sides) to be one of underlying suspicion and hostility, seeing 
media coverage of war zones in particular as something both useless and potentially 
dangerous. After a controversial attempt by the American government to exclude the 
media altogether from the military intervention in Grenada in 1983, an official 
investigation next year led to the creation of the "press pool," a group of representative 
journalists selected by prior agreement to work closely with the troops. Bedevilled by 
mutual suspicion and military assumptions as to what the impact of unrestricted reporting 
might be, this system functioned badly in the intervention in Panama in 1989, and then 
broke down altogether in mutual recrimination in the Gulf War.24 Meanwhile, from the 
start of the Gulf crisis in August 1990 the American government worked hard to control 
the media by exploiting their institutional vulnerabilities, particularly their commercial 
dependence upon a steady flow of good news stories. In mutual miscomprehension, each 
correct according to its own initial assumptions, the American defence establishment 
maintained that it had treated the media well, while the journalists protested vigorously at 
the manner in which they believed that the government had manipulated them. What both 
sides agreed upon was that the American government, before it had felt confident enough 
to employ military force against Iraq, had needed to create not just an international 
consensus but a suitable domestic environment by exploiting the media to influence 
public opinion.25  
The damage caused by the Gulf War to American military-media and government-media 
relations appears to be both severe and long-lasting. Although senior American 
government officials and media executives met in Autumn 1991 to re-negotiate agreed 
guidelines for future conflicts, there was little expectation that the agreement would last, 
and it collapsed almost immediately.26 Indeed, critics of American media behavior in the 
Gulf War pointed out that, even in their own most basic terms, it was not in the interests 
of the major television networks (ABC, CBS and NBC) to cooperate with the military as 
closely as they had done, since all three had lost money in covering the war through loss 
of advertising revenue (CNN was the exception in selling its cable service). "If they 
wouldn't fight the Pentagon for love of Freedom," it was argued, "why didn't the 
networks and press fight the Administration for love of money?"27 The first signs that this 
might indeed be the networks' policy for the future, with any concern for the wishes of 
the government weighing less than the need for ratings and revenue, came in the 
unrestrained television coverage of the 1992 Los Angeles riots.  
The view of the American military by this time was that their policy in the Gulf crisis and 
war had been a success, and that manipulation of an independent media was better than 
attempting to exert direct control, but that this manipulation took time and effort to 
achieve. Left to itself, the American media might still take an independent and 
unpredictable line, as it did in largely espousing the cause of the Bosnian government in 
former Yugoslavia (1992-94). American government and military relations with the 
media remained poor during the intervention in Somalia, to the extent that the first troops 
landing in December 1992 were not aware that the press was waiting, and briefly mistook 
camera flashlights at night for gunfire. In a disputed example of the "CNN Effect," 
television images of a dead US soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu 
on 3 October 1993 are also believed to have played a significant part in the American 
decision to withdraw from Somalia. General Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff was quite explicit about this, writing that "We had been drawn to this 
place by television images; now we were being repelled by them. The President 
immediately conducted a policy review that resulted in a plan for withdrawal over the 
next six months."28 By the time of their deployment to Rwanda in July 1994, the 
Americans were so concerned about a possible "quagmire" that (like the French) they 
refused to allow their troops to come under direct UN command, and so restricted 
themselves in their actions as to earn their operation the epithet "mission shrink."29 
However, despite dramatic American and international television coverage of the 
aftermath of the Rwanda massacres, events and international responses failed to fit any 
previous pattern or hypothesis of the impact of the media upon decision-making.  
The breakdown in relations between the American government and its own media over 
the coverage of military operations finally came to a head in the planned intervention in 
Haiti as a humanitarian operation sanctioned by the UN, when American television 
networks gained access to the country days before the planned landings and threatened to 
transmit them live as they happened, regardless of any issues of military security or 
safety. Government attempts to re-establish guidelines by negotiation were only partly 
successful, with the networks clearly in the dominant position. The landings finally took 
place peacefully after negotiations with the incumbent Haitian authorities.30 To all 
appearances, American attempts to use force in the prosecution of a UN mandate had 
been thwarted or subverted by their own media. But events were not actually so one-
sided. A complex campaign in support of the eventual landings on Haiti was mounted by 
American military psychological operations (PSYOPS) teams, stretching back over 140 
days before the landings actually look place. Part of this campaign was radio and 
television beamed to Haiti itself, including political propaganda broadcasts from special 
American aircraft.31 Among the effects of this PSYOPS plan was that it captured the 
American media agenda for the operation, enabling the government to direct the content 
of domestic news regarding Haiti, very much as had happened in the Gulf War. A landing 
without fighting and with virtually no casualties, culminating in a broadly successful 
operation to restore the Haitian government, was also by no means an American defeat.  
Further American military thinking has recently produced a fusion of such concepts of 
psychological operations and media manipulation together with an idea developed from 
the success of the initial air strikes against communications centres in Baghdad at the 
start of the Gulf War.32 Known as "Command and Control Warfare" (C2W), this was 
originally a concept for pre-emptive defence based on the idea that physical invasion and 
occupation of territory and large casualties (to either side) have become increasingly 
politically unacceptable. The idea of C2W is to strike either electronically or physically 
(by missiles or precision air-delivered weapons) at the enemy's communications systems, 
causing relatively few casualties but effectively paralyzing their military capabilities.33 A 
less radical use for C2W is that employed in the Gulf War, to disable the Iraqi army 
before a ground offensive destroyed it. It is probable that a similar effect was achieved by 
the American precision bombing attacks on Bosnian Serb positions in September 1995, 
prior to the successful Croat and Bosnian offensives which led to the peace settlement in 
Dayton, Ohio on 22 November.  
At present even C2W has barely been assimilated into military thinking and practice 
following the Gulf War. But already a fusion of PSYOPS with C2W is being debated 
within the US Armed Forces, known as "Information Warfare" or INFOWAR. Like the 
"Star Wars" Strategic Defense Initiative, INFOWAR is highly speculative and based on 
concepts first developed in the science fiction and techno-fiction of the previous 
decade.34 INFOWAR combines propaganda, computer virus attacks through the internet, 
economic warfare and selective sanctions, missile attacks against economic or political 
targets, and media manipulation, to coerce or destabilize a target country while keeping 
physical damage and visible violence to a minimum. Ironically, some of its proponents 
are already concerned that the most vulnerable target for INFOWAR would be the United 
States itself, as the nation most dependent on electronics and information for its 
prosperity.35  
The immediately obvious comparison is between INFOWAR and American attempts to 
"bomb back into the stone age" a North Vietnamese economy that was too 
underdeveloped to respond to such a form of attack in the manner expected of it. But 
from Vietnam onwards, the whole development of American military relations with the 
media, down to and including INFOWAR, has been rather more analogous to the 
development of nuclear weapons and subsequent deterrence theory. In both cases, 
strategies have been devised and actions taken on the basis of military assessment and 
necessity, and the availability of new technology, effectively without reference to any 
political values or the views of the voting population. The interesting distinction is that 
whereas deterrence theory dealt with weapons of mass destruction, INFOWAR postulates 
an ideal of victory without physical damage to the enemy.  
PROPAGANDA AND PEACEKEEPING: A NEW PRACTICE? 
Since 1990, the attitude of the United States' government toward its own media and 
people in the decision-making process relating to the use of military force has, in turn, 
generated a reciprocal attitude among other countries. There is an emerging belief among 
otherwise poor or militarily weak states that are under threat or even at war, that they can 
exploit American media influence in all its forms as a relatively cheap way of gaining a 
military advantage, or to subvert a UN peacekeeping operation in their own favor.  
In one sense there is nothing very new about this. Weak states (or aspiring states) under 
military attack have always had little choice but to appeal for outside intervention (the 
Southern Confederacy 1861-65 being only one example). References to "world public 
opinion" in recent UN peacekeeping operations are virtually identical to the rhetoric of 
the League of Nations during the inter-war years, and in particular the appeals of 
Abyssinia in 1935-36 for outside support against Italy. The difference lies in successive 
attempts by states in crisis to identify effective world public opinion and direct their 
efforts more precisely to its mobilization. An important mid-point in the process was the 
ultimately unsuccessful attempt of the Biafran government during the Nigerian Civil War 
(1967-70) to mobilize support by seeking to exploit the famine within its own country as 
a propaganda weapon, directed through television and advertising consultancies at elite 
opinion in Britain in particular.36 Significantly, Biafran propaganda was sufficiently 
successful to lead to speculation in international law on the right of humanitarian 
intervention in cases of barbarism, which helped lay the foundation for the doctrine 
developed after the Gulf War.37  
Probably the first true modern case of completely successful manipulation of elite 
opinion in another country toward support for the use of military force was that of the 
Kuwaiti government in exile following the Iraqi occupation of August 1990. With 
considerable political sophistication, the Kuwaitis successfully manipulated elite opinion 
within the United States toward supporting a war which led some six months later to their 
regaining their country. The Kuwaitis also enjoyed the advantage that, broadly, the 
United States' government supported their actions. Costing approximately US$11 million, 
employing a leading American public relations firm and the cover organization "Citizens 
for a Free Kuwait," the Kuwaiti strategy was to spend relatively little on overt advertising 
and concentrate on public relations and media manipulation aimed at the elites of the 
United States, on the well-known propaganda principles that the best propaganda comes 
from those who do not know they are propagandists. The Kuwaiti campaign included the 
use of fictitious atrocity propaganda, culminating in a special audio-visual presentation to 
the UN Security Council two days before the vote on the "all necessary means" 
Resolution 678 of 29 November.38  
The case of Kuwait had many and obvious special features, and the extent to which the 
Kuwaiti propaganda campaign contributed to the eventual recovery of their country must 
(as with all propaganda endeavors) remain a matter of judgement and opinion. What is 
significant is that other countries have concluded from the experience that their slender 
resources might also be invested in a similar manner. Sometimes the discussion has been 
quite open. In Nicosia in August 1994 an American political lobbyist publicly promised 
the Cypriot government that in return for an outlay of US$150 million over three years to 
spend in Washington (compared to a Cypriot defence budget of about US$200 million a 
year) he could guarantee a change in American policy leading to the reunification of 
Cyprus.39 The Baltic states of the former Soviet Union have also developed similar plans. 
It has even been (unofficially and improbably) claimed that General Mohammed Farah 
Aideed of Somalia directed a deliberate campaign through global television to defeat the 
American and UN peacekeeping effort in his country.  
In former Yugoslavia this form of directed propaganda was turned against the UN 
peacekeeping effort, as all sides exploited the media with the aim of influencing 
American elite opinion in particular. According to UN peacekeepers, this included armed 
forces deliberately staging attacks upon their own troops or even their own civilians. The 
UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) chief of staff and commander in Sarajevo in the first 
half of 1992, the Canadian Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, explained at his final press 
conference on 21 July that there was no ceasefire "because I can't keep the two sides from 
firing on their own positions for the benefit of CNN."40 MacKenzie and others believed 
that this was part of a deliberate political strategy by the Bosnian government in 
particular to discredit UNPROFOR and so bring about a large-scale American military 
intervention.  
Part of the propaganda war was a successful Bosnian government campaign to discredit 
MacKenzie personally (including stories that his wife was a Serb). The UN's response 
was to ignore such stories, rather than take action to refute them, and by June they had 
reached such a level that MacKenzie asked to be relieved as he could no longer function 
without risk to his troops, identified as "MacKenzie's men." In November 1992, 
coinciding with the Islamic Conference in Saudi Arabia, the Bosnian government claimed 
that MacKenzie had raped and murdered three or four Muslim girls obtained for him at a 
Serb concentration camp. By 1995, this story was being reported as regular visits by 
MacKenzie to a Serb camp brothel stocked with Muslim girls.41 While such propaganda 
continued within Bosnia itself, the UN commander in Sarajevo from early 1994 onwards, 
the British Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose, was also subject to a propaganda 
campaign directed outward, partly through the international media, aimed with some 
success at undermining his credibility in Washington and with the UN in New York. 
Again, this campaign was made more effective by the initial UN refusal to take it 
seriously, or to mount any form of countermeasures against it. Lieutenant-General Rose's 
own public comment after he in turn had left Sarajevo was that "It is of course 
understandable that a Government struggling for survival should have a propaganda 
machine. It is not understandable that the international media should become part of that 
machine."42 Certainly some correspondents in Sarajevo, particularly from the United 
States, became famous for aggressively challenging the UNPROFOR line at press 
conferences.43  
A further tactic to which UN peacekeepers had no adequate response was the use of 
national or local media in Yugoslavia, principally radio and television, to issue hate 
propaganda either before or during a peacekeeping operation. In a manner reminiscent of 
INFOWAR, in the six months before the Bosnian declaration of independence of April 
1992, the Serb-controlled Yugoslav National Army seized or destroyed eight out of 
eleven Bosnian main television transmitters, allowing inflammatory Serb propaganda to 
be broadcast over half of Bosnia. "The media space in Bosnia was shattered by force, 
before the territorial space was shattered by much greater force."44 In Rwanda, the Hutu-
controlled propaganda station Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines played a 
similar role in stimulating the genocide in April 1994.45 The ability of such blatant (and 
often absurd) hate propaganda to incite apparently stable communities to violence is 
contrary to most classical theories of the impact of the media upon its recipients, and 
therefore something of a puzzle.46 A pessimistic view is that atrocities such as those in 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda could not have occurred without hate propaganda first 
meeting a deep resonance of prior agreement among those toward which it was directed. 
If it is true that such propaganda only gives voice to a hatred that was already latent, then 
there is very little that peacekeeping forces can do to rectify the situation, or indeed to 
keep the peace.47 However, another hypothesis which may at least co-exist with the first 
is that in non-democratic countries control of the national media has always been one of 
the most important symbols and instruments of political power. How deeply people 
"believe" official pronouncements is less important than their acceptance that they 
represent the voice of authority, to be obeyed rather than challenged. (Indeed, the skills 
developed by many who lived under communist rule in eastern Europe in decoding the 
official media became a commonplace of the Cold War.) The power over the UN and the 
United States demonstrated by General Aideed to his own people dragging the bodies of 
his enemies through the streets of Mogadishu was at least as important as any effect that 
its reporting on American television might have had.  
If this second hypothesis is even partly correct, then a proactive response by the UN or its 
member states both toward hate propaganda and its disseminators might have been 
effective on past peacekeeping operations, and may be so in the future. However, despite 
an awareness within the UN of the problem, there is at present no UN institution or 
doctrine for dealing with it, and responses of countries engaged in UN peacekeeping 
operations have been limited and slow. The British as part of their peacekeeping role in 
Bosnia took until late 1994 to formulate a "civil information" program, including radio 
and an "UNPROFOR TV" service to the region; while the UN radio station established 
by the United States in Somalia on PSYOPS lines proved unpopular and less than 
effective.48  
The international media cannot be held responsible for the failure of UN peacekeeping in 
Bosnia or Somalia, any more than for the loss of the Vietnam War. Propaganda directed 
toward the American elite from within both countries has been crude in the extreme, 
particularly in the early stages of conflict. It has been effective only because it was 
allowed to persist unopposed.49 In contrast to the Gulf War, senior officers on UN 
peacekeeping duties in Bosnia and Croatia were often unaware of how much attention 
was being paid (particularly in the United States) to their remarks to the media on the 
spot, and what the possible effect might be. But the choice of an appropriate response to 
this phenomenon is self-evidently not an easy one for the UN or its member states. The 
United States, and some other NATO countries to a much lesser extent, possess the 
equipment and weaponry either to jam radio and television transmissions within a target 
country, or to destroy transmitters in a manner similar to the attacks on Baghdad in 1991. 
The obvious difficulty is the issue which this raises concerning state sovereignty when 
seen as part of UN peacekeeping, together with the problem of the effectiveness of 
bombing such targets. The use of UN troops on the ground for such an operation was 
tried by the Americans in Somalia in June 1993, following their decision to treat General 
Aideed as an enemy, with an attempt to capture his radio propaganda station (together 
with other targets) which failed with eighty Pakistani peacekeepers killed or wounded, 
and effectively undermined the UN position in Somalia.50 Such actions are also 
ineffective against some types of propaganda, such as newsprint and the circulation of 
audio or video cassettes (a familiar way of distributing politicized sermons in some 
Muslim countries).  
A further evident problem for the UN in dealing with hate propaganda is that traditionally 
it has been a supporter of freedom of speech in all forms. It has even been suggested that 
the almost automatic blanket UN sanctions in response to war should include an 
exemption for newspapers, books and woodpulp, in order to permit the wider circulation 
of newspapers for discussion of the issues within the target country. A further suggestion 
is that the role of countering hate propaganda should be undertaken by Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as Reporteurs sans Frontieres and the World 
Press Freedom Committee, carrying out what has been called "preventive journalism" in 
the UN's name.51 Although such suggestions hardly constitute a strong response to the 
problem, they are at present considered too radical to be implemented.  
A NATO ALTERNATIVE: TOWARD A NEW THEORY 
One of the chief concerns about the effect of the media upon humanitarian or 
peacekeeping deployments expressed in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War was the 
(misnamed) CNN Effect, or even "CNN Curve," of policy being driven by rapidly 
fluctuating public opinion.52 Since the initial alarm about this in 1991, further research 
and experience have cast increasing doubts upon the validity of the idea of a simple 
trigger mechanism whereby a live television report will at once generate a political 
response at the highest level.53 In particular, the violent events in Chechenya in 
December 1994 as relayed by international television, as well as those in Rwanda from 
April 1994 onwards, singularly failed to fit the expected pattern. So far the only viable 
conclusion is the rather trite one that, although the CNN Effect may happen, it is unusual, 
unpredictable, and part of a complex relationship of factors.  
One early and clear example of the CNN Effect (although not generated by CNN but 
chiefly by the BBC) was the television broadcasts of the plight of the Kurds in northern 
Iraq shown in March 1991. The impact of these pictures on the British government was 
sufficient for it to push for a change in policy toward the Kurds, forcing (together with 
the French) a more interventionist approach from the United States, and the establishment 
of UN "Safe Havens" in northern Iraq.54 This was a critical event for the future 
development of peacekeeping operations, particularly in respect of their relation to the 
media. As far as is known, the American plan for war with Iraq, Operation Desert Storm, 
had no humanitarian annex or other provision for relief operations in the aftermath of the 
war, and stressed rapid withdrawal of United States' forces in keeping with American 
doctrine. In the event the Americans contributed a small majority of the 8,000 troops used 
to establish the Safe Havens, with the British and French providing most of the 
remainder.  
The British had already had their own bad experience of military-media relations in the 
Falklands War of 1982, following which the British government and military had taken 
positive steps to improve their mutual understanding with their national media (which 
increasingly functioned into the 1980s as a junior partner to the American media on the 
international scene).55 Having partly absorbed American fears about the impact of the 
media, the British in the Gulf War also used a pool system for front-line journalists, but 
lacking the underlying mutual antagonism of the Americans this functioned reasonably 
well. As a result, the British emerged from the Gulf War with relations between their 
armed forces and their reporters still largely intact, and with little sense that the British 
government had tried to manipulate the media or public opinion, other than within the 
limits of normal British political tolerance.56 Indeed, one of the lessons that the British 
took from the Gulf War was that the public had a good understanding of the limitations of 
the media in covering a war.57 Lacking the prior experience of the British, the French 
forces and media in the Gulf War endured mutual problems and friction quite similar to 
those of the British in the Falklands. But in the improvised relief operation to establish 
the Safe Havens there was no time for either country's forces to attempt the elaborate 
controls of the media that had characterized the Gulf War itself. More importantly, the 
British and French armed forces at least found that their national media were very willing 
to act in support of a humanitarian operation, the need for which they had first brought to 
wider attention. In some cases at least, a sense of community developed between 
journalists and soldiers, together with a willingness to blame the United States rather than 
their own governments for the eventual withdrawal of their forces.58  
This shared experience, and a belief that some parts of the international media at least 
would willingly act in support of peacekeeping operations, became important in the 
second of the UNPROFOR deployments, to Bosnia and Croatia in 1992. In highly 
dangerous conditions, reporters were actually more at risk than many of the UNPROFOR 
troops, and suffered a comparable casualty rate.59 The pool system, anathema to 
American journalists after the Gulf War, was revived unofficially by the journalists 
themselves as a means of self-protection. In Sarajevo a self-organized television pool 
system ran from July 1992 until August 1995, while live direct broadcasting from the 
front lines was abandoned by many television journalists as too dangerous, in favor of the 
common practice of broadcasts recorded a few hours before transmission. The first large 
British Army deployment to Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR also introduced an unofficial 
convoy system for journalists, giving them a degree of military protection to which, in 
strict interpretation of UN rules, they were not entitled.60 All this was done since, despite 
the problems suffered by UNPROFOR commanders as the subject of attacks from both 
the regional and international media, the international media could also on occasion be of 
great value to the same UNPROFOR commanders, who found that they could use 
television film (strictly speaking videotape) taken of an event such as a local ceasefire 
agreement as a permanent record, almost in the form of a treaty, to confront ceasefire 
violators with "world public opinion," and even to face down governments and leaders of 
the warring factions by threatening them with media exposure. Major-General 
MacKenzie later expressed the view that the media was "the only major weapon system 
that I had" in his attempt to keep the peace in Sarajevo.61  
At least in the early stages of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, 
therefore, there was a community of interest between the peacekeepers of the NATO 
countries (Canada, France and Britain in particular) and the international media (in which 
contingents from these countries were all represented under American dominance) that 
was potentially available to strengthen the peacekeeping process. Over the period 1992-
94 this potential failed to be realized for many reasons, not all of them directly connected 
with military-media relations, with the result that some parts of the international media, at 
least, began to turn against UNPROFOR and its commanders. Among the problems most 
directly related to the media, the general failure of the UN to be proactive in its approach, 
and its failure to protect peacekeepers from propaganda attacks, have already been noted. 
Institutionally, the UN is presently ill-suited to make such a response, since its doctrines 
of "even-handedness" and "impartiality" make it theoretically impossible for its 
peacekeepers to associate themselves with the journalists of any particular country, even 
those of their own nationality or of international status. In former Yugoslavia this rule 
was widely violated by both the peacekeepers and the media for entirely practical 
reasons, and has fallen into disuse and disrepute. However, officers of the UNPROFOR 
contingents who made  often successful  use of the international media in their 
peacekeeping efforts also developed the strong impression (rightly or wrongly) that both 
the UN in New York and their own governments did not approve of their behavior, and 
that the eventual result was damaging to their personal careers.62  
Even more importantly, the threat of "world public opinion," whether relayed through 
satellite direct television broadcasting or not, is only of value if it produces some form of 
positive response from the "world" at which it is aimed (in this case very largely the elite 
opinion of the NATO powers and the United States in particular). Over the twelve 
months from spring 1992, leaders of the various governments and factions in former 
Yugoslavia learned that the UN's threats might be defied with impunity, while the 
original consensus between UNPROFOR and the international media began to collapse 
as journalists in Sarajevo became increasingly critical of the UN's failure. The situation 
may not have been helped by the fact that senior UNPROFOR commanders in the early 
stages were from countries whose armed forces had relatively little previous experience 
in dealing with the media; while the international media remained dominated by 
American journalists, who transferred some of their traditional hostility and suspicion of 
their own government and military onto the UN peacekeepers.  
This deteriorating relationship between the UN and the international press in Sarajevo 
culminated in early 1993 in a rare attempt by UNPROFOR to use the media proactively 
on an international scale, which backfired with unforeseen and very damaging results. In 
April, Bosnian Serb forces were on the verge of capturing the town of Srebenica, held by 
Bosnian government forces, and agreed to a UN ceasefire only if the town were 
demilitarized. With the Sarajevo press corps already talking of a "UN surrender" to the 
Serbs, the UNPROFOR commander Lieutenant-General Philippe Morillon, after a 
dramatic personal visit to Srebenica, chose to break the news of a ceasefire agreement 
through the UN New York press office, briefing reporters there by radio before talking to 
the journalists in Sarajevo. The intention was to limit media criticism of the UN; the 
result was the exact opposite. In another example of the CNN Effect, the shock in New 
York of the Srebenica story was the direct cause of a revolt among the non-permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, which led to Resolution 819 of 16 April, declaring 
the town a "Safe Area" (a term which unlike "Safe Haven" has no recognized legal 
meaning).63 The assumption of responsibility for the "Safe Areas" marked the beginning 
of the failure of UN peacekeeping policy in Bosnia, culminating in the crisis of summer 
1995. This was as much a product of the lack of familiarity with the problems and 
potential of the international media at all levels in the UN as any other factor. The "Safe 
Areas" episode is also a good example of the manner in which the international media 
acts upon, and interconnects, all action in a peacekeeping operation from the very front 
lines to the highest levels of policy decision-making.  
The failure to develop successful cooperation between UN peacekeepers and the 
international media in former Yugoslavia has led some to a pessimistic view that gradual 
or highly limited humanitarian interventions in other countries may be effectively 
impossible. Military men in particular have begun to argue that if a policy is 
insufficiently "resolute" (their code for an early use of extreme force on the American 
model), then the long-term effects of the international media coupled with the 
propaganda of the target states will combine to subvert the peacekeeping process. Major-
General MacKenzie has endorsed this view, arguing that "in the absence of policy or 
principle, UN actions are often driven by the media."64 In the most recent peacekeeping 
deployment, to Rwanda in 1994, neither the British nor the French made any significant 
provision for cooperation with the media, nor to address the problem of hostile 
propaganda.  
CONCLUSION 
The problem of military-media relations in UN peacekeeping operations clearly goes 
much deeper than the single bad experience of Bosnia. Current UN theories and doctrines 
of peacekeeping, particularly as reflected in such ideas as "Wider Peacekeeping," depend 
heavily upon the peacekeeping force being able to create a major impression upon the 
inhabitants of the target country with the provision of only minimum forces, by 
exploiting the authority of the UN and the threat of further action, including military 
action. In short, "Wider Peacekeeping" has some similarities with deterrence theory, in 
that it depends very heavily upon the perceptions created in the minds of the target 
audience. Logically, it should have followed that such a doctrine would also be based 
very heavily upon a proactive approach to the various forms of the media that may be 
available to create such a perception, and that the appropriate institutions, equipment and 
procedures should have been created either by the UN or by countries (such as those of 
NATO) taking part in peacekeeping operations, or by both. This has not happened over 
the last five years, partly because of institutional problems within the UN in accepting the 
need for such reforms; and partly because the dominant country within both NATO and 
the UN, the United States, holds to a significantly different doctrine based on military 
force and the manipulation of the media.  
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